I thank the gentleman

for yielding.

First, let me stress, this bill has

strong bipartisan support. It also has

significant bipartisan opposition. And

so it should be considered in the category

of individual judgment, not politics.

On the plus side of the bill, let me

note that it does stress sanctions, not

military action, and it quite properly

gives the executive discretion to lift

these sanctions.

On the minus side, and this is the

compelling point, it represents an escalation

of tension, policy, and attitudinal

friction with Iran.

It is an escalation that is guaranteed

to fail. You might ask, Why is it guaranteed

to fail? It is because unilateral

sanctions don’t work, and there is no

evidence that the other principal parties

that are dealing with Iran will follow

this example.

We can pound our chest all we want

to suggest that a Russia or a China

should follow our lead, but these kinds

of suggestions from Congress simply

carry no weight.

Secondly, no one should doubt that

this complicates problems for our

troops in Iraq today. That is an absolute

utter circumstance that has to be

dealt with, and we have to think it

through.

Thirdly, this step implicitly underscores

and advances a diplomacy-less

strategy. That is, the United States of

America has advanced a no-talk-with-

Iran strategy for more than this administration,

for quite a number of

years, and the question is does it work,

is it as hapless as our strategy towards

certain other countries in the world,

including Cuba.

In the backdrop is the issue of force,

and also the issue of dominoes, dominoes

in the sense of decision-making.

Often policies that don’t work implicitly

are followed by other policies that

we hope will work. If this particular

policy doesn’t work, do we then have to

go to the force option?

There is a neocon desire, as has been

written about extensively, to consider

the idea of a preemptive strike. All I

would say is there is a ‘‘3–3–100’’ set of

principles that we have to think

through.

The first ‘‘three’’ is there are three

ways of obtaining nuclear weapons: one

is to develop them; another is to steal

them; and another is to buy them.

If we bomb Iran, there is no doubt

whatsoever we will put back their capacity

to develop. But it might also accelerate

the capacity to steal or purchase.

The second ‘‘three’’ principle is that

there are three weapons of mass destruction.

We not only have nuclear;

we have chemical and biological. And

knocking back their nuclear certainly

will accelerate the other two.

The third issue is the issue of a ‘‘hundred.’’

We have the idea that we can do

a preemptive strike quickly and it will

be over. But the fact is that the other

side will respond. They might respond

for 100 years.

I think it is time we talk about from

the people’s House the issue of developing

mutual self-interest, not antagonism,

and we ought to move in the direction

of realism instead of taking

ideological steps that don’t fit the

times.